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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Taxation-Business Expenses Deduction of Clayton Act
Treble Damages
For many years the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has de-
nied, on grounds of public policy, the deduction under section 162
of the Internal Revenue Code of fines and penalties arising from
business activities.' The Commissioner seemingly reversed himself,
however, when he announced in Revenue Ruling 64-224 that treble
damages paid by manufacturers to their customers in settlement of
suits brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act could be deducted
as a business expense.2
In the recent case of Commissioner v. Tellier' the United States
Supreme Court laid down a three part test for non-deductibility that
throws doubt on the correctness of Revenue Ruling 64-224. In
'4A MERTONS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 25.50-53 (1966).
Section 162(a) allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. . . ." The early cases disallowing deductions for fines and penalties
followed a theory that no such expenses were "ordinary and necessary."
E.g., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178, 180 (2d
Cir. 1931). Generally, however, "ordinary and necessary" requires only
that an expense be directly related to a business and considered "helpful"
within the trade as a means of pursuing that business. Commissioner v.
Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,
113-14 (1933); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928).
More recent cases attempt to determine if the expense is ordinary and neces-
sary apart from the question of whether allowance of the deduction would
be against public policy. Coed Records, Inc., 47 T.C. No. 41, (1967);
Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 694 (1965), aff'd, 383 U.S. 687(1966). Separation of the two issues is desirable because it focuses the
attention of the court on the policy which is said to require disallowance
rather than on the wrongful conduct of the taxpayer. Where the activity
that gives rise to a fine is one that is uncommon in a trade, it would still be
appropriate to deny a deduction on the grounds that it is not "ordinary and
necessary" apart from considerations of policy. United Draperies, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1965).2 Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cul. BULL. 52. The Ruling was issued in the
wake of the famous "Philadelphia electric cases" in which many of the
nations manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment were found guilty of
rigging prices submitted to both public and private utility companies. Under
the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act the manufacturing corporations
were heavily fined; some 30 corporate executives received fines, and in a
few cases, prison sentences. 1800 civil suits were then brought under the
Clayton Act, and it has been estimated that at least $300,000,000 has been
paid out by the electric companies in settlement of them. See STAFF OF
JOINT COMMITrEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
STAFF STUDY OF INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS
UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1-3 (Comm. Print 1965).
"383 U.S. 687 (1966).
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Tellier the issue was whether expenses for counsel incurred in a
losing fight against a criminal charge growing out of the conduct of
a business could be deducted as a business expense. The opinion
states that an expense may be disallowed when allowance would
frustrate a sharply defined policy of some other state or federal law.
Further, the policy that might be frustrated must be one that is
evidenced in a governmental declaration. Finally, the frustration
which would result from allowance of the deduction must be severe
to justify disallowance. In Tellier the deduction was allowed be-
cause there is no policy against the employment of counsel that
could be frustrated by a deduction. The question this note attempts
to answer is whether a deduction for treble damages paid by manu-
facturers convicted of price fixing should be disallowed under the
three part test of Tellier.
DoEs ALLOWANCE FRUSTRATE SHARPLY DEFINED POLICY
OF THE CLAYTON ACT?
If the treble damages provided by section 4 of the Clayton Act
are punitive, i.e., if the policy of section 4 is to deter price fixing, a
strong argument can be made that deduction of those damages
should not be allowed. The Commissioner continued to maintain
that amounts paid for fines and penalties should not be deducted as
a business expense,4 because to do so would reduce the "sting" of
the penalty and thereby encourage the taxpayer to violate the statute
under which the penalty was imposed.5 If, however, the purpose
of the treble damages of the Clayton Act is to compensate the party
injured in his business, the deduction should be allowed, just as
compensatory damages paid by a business after judgment in a negli-
'Coed Records, Inc., 47 T.C. No. 41 (1967).
'Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958).
It has been pointed out that disallowance of a deduction does more than
merely protect the policy of the statute that has been violated. When no
deduction is given, the burden of the penalty is increased because the tax-
payer must pay tax on money that he does not have. Since the economic
impact of disallowance can vary greatly on different facts, and since this in-
crease in tax burden may or may not show any relationship to the penalty
provided by the statute that has been violated, critics have suggested that
the doctrine of disallowance should be abandoned unless the statute that
provides the penalty should itself call for disallowance of a deduction. Com-
ment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problens
of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 116-23 (1962) ;
Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A. L. R-v. 26,
34-40 (1958).
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gence suit are deducted.' It is also possible that the treble damages
of section 4 may serve both punitive and compensatory policies.
In this case it would seem that the deduction should be disallowed
to prevent frustration of one of the policies of the Clayton Act.'
In Revenue Ruling 64-224 the Commissioner takes the position
that the treble damages of section 4 of the Clayton Act are com-
pensatory in nature.8 The legislative history of both the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act supports his position. Sections 1, 2, and 3
of the Sherman Act provide a fine of $50,000 and imprisonment
for one year for violation of its provisions,9 and it is clear that
this fine may not be deducted as a business expense.' In contra-
distinction section 4 of the Clayton Act refers to "threefold dam-
ages" for "any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty."" Section 4A of the Clayton Act provides "actual damages"
whenever the United States is injured by a violation of the antitrust
laws.' 2 During the debate Senator Sherman compared the two types
of provisions ::"
It is the second section that gives the civil suit, and that is not
to be prosecuted at all by the United States .... The first section
deals with the public injury to the people of the United States
and there the suit is brought . . . to restrain, limit, and control
such arrangements as far as they are illegal. The second section
gives a private remedy to every person injured. It seems to me
the two sections are as distinct from each other as possible.
When asked more specifically if the treble damages of the proposed
legislation were penal in nature, Senator Regan said, "This mea-
sure is given a civil remedy. It is not in the nature of a prosecution
for crime."' 4
'Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (1935).
" In Cox v. Lykes, 237 N.Y. 376, 143 N.E. 226 (1924) (Cardoza, J.), it
was said, "We are to remember that the same provision may be penal as to
the offender and remedial as to the sufferer .... The nature of the problem
will determine whether we are to take one viewpoint of the other."
'Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 52.
°69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964).1' See Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1949) (fines against illegal
gambling business); Universal Atlas Cement Co.- v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.
971 (1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962(1949) (state antitrust fines) ; I. T. 1174, I-1 Cum. BuLL. 269 (1922).1138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
1269 Stat. 212 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1964).
1121 CONG. Rzc. 2563 (1890).
1421 CONG. REc. 3147 (1890). The provision under discussion became
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The case law also provides considerable support for the Com-
missioner's position that the treble damages are compensatory. In
United States v. Cooper Corp.'5 it was said that "the [Clayton]
Act envisaged two classes of action-those made available to the
government. . . and, in addition, a right of action for treble damages
granted to redress private injury.""" Cases involving other statutory
damages analogous to the treble damages of the Clayton Act fre-
quently stress the compensatory aspect of those damages. In Over-
night Transport Corp. v. Missel'7 it was held that statutory double
damages paid by an employer to an employee for failure to pay
required overtime were compensatory. The theory of Missel is that
the excess over actual damages provided by the statute is supplied
not to punish, but to insure that the injured party will not be pre-
vented from attaining an adequate recovery by the cost of a lengthy
and complicated suit or difficulty in proving his damages.' Section
4 of the Clayton Act may reflect a similar policy in that it provides
not only for enhanced damages but for the costs of suit and a
reasonable attorney's fee as well.' 9 Finally the Commissioner can
also point to an older Ruling in which treble damages for payments
to private parties under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
were held deductable.20
section 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). It was taken over, with
minor changes, to become section 4 of the Clayton Act in 1914. When the
fine under the Sherman Act was increased in 1955 from $5000 to $50,000,
committee reports were issued indicating that the only penalties provided by
antitrust law were those in the Sherman Act. t.R. R P,. No. 618, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955); S. REP. No. 70, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
' 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
2
0 Id. at 608
17316 U.S. 572 (1942).8Id. at 583. The Commissioner also points to Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657, 686 (1892), holding that statutory damages are not penal in nature
for purposes of enforcement of a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction, and to
Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 153 (1899), holding statutory damages not
penal for application of a statute of limitations. The force of such cases is
greatly reduced by the more recent case of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386(1947) where it was held that even if the damages provided by a federal
statute were considered penal, state courts would have to take jurisdiction
over an action brought before them. Where a federal statute is involved, it
is no longer necessary to label the damages "compensatory" in order to get
a trial in a state court.
'°38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
"I. T. 3630, 1943 Cum. Buml. 113. Chiefly because of the precedent of
I. T. 3630, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has accepted
the viewpoint of the Internal Revenue Service. This acceptance is impor-
tant because another clue to the policy expressed by statutory damages may
be found in the opinion of the administrative agency in charge of enforce-
19671 1111
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Cases dealing specifically with Clayton Act recoveries contradict
the Commissioner, however, in treating the two-thirds of an award
that is in excess of actual damages as punitive in character. In
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Corp.,21 where the taxpayer was
an injured party who had received a treble damage award, the one-
third actual damage was taxable to the recipient because it was com-
pensation for lost income. It was held that the two-thirds excess
damages were also taxable to the recipient, even though these dam-
ages were punitive. It would seem that whether the actual damages
are taxable to the recipient as a replacement of lost income or are
considered a tax free return of capital, they are compensatory from
the point of view of the party paying the damages. In either event,
however, the two-thirds excess would be characterized as penal.
Lower court opinions express a theory that these punitive excess
damages were made available to multiply the agencies that would
help support the act,22 increase public respect for the Sherman Act,
and provide a "sanction allowed to a private litigant, because of the
public interest."' '24
The Commissioner's case is further weakened by a surprising
inconsistency within Revenue Ruling 64-224 itself. A second hold-
ing of the Ruling is that actual damages paid to the government as
an injured party under section 4A of the Clayton Act may not be
deducted by the taxpayer as a business expense:
Amounts paid in satisfaction of damage claims by the United
States under section 4A of the Clayton Act . . .although re-
sembling restitution, are in effect punishment for injury to the
public occasioned by the violation of law. . . . The illegality
ment of the act providing the damages. See Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949). Although the Antitrust
Division has expressed willingness to argue that Clayton Act damages are
a penalty, it feels that allowance of the deduction will not necessarily en-
courage potential violators of the Sherman Act to treat the possibility of
incurring treble damages as a "business risk." Even if full deduction is
allowed, the business suffering judgment will still, if the income tax rate is
50%, be subjected to an irreplaceable loss of 150% on every dollar that is
earned in violation of the Sherman Act. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, STAFF STUDY OF INcOME TAX TREAT-
MENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAws, Appen-
dix E (Comm. Print Nov. 1, 1965).
2 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
'
2Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893
(5th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
:'Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1943).
2' Karseal Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (1955) (dictum).
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giving rise to the damage combined with the fact that the injury
is inflicted upon the Government requires that such payments not
be allowed as deductions.
The language of section 4A and section 4 is practically identical.
It is a strange result that "actual damages" when paid to the gov-
ernment are punitive and "threefold damages" paid to private liti-
gants are entirely compensatory. In both situations illegality gives
rise to damages. If the recoupment of actual damages by the gov-
ernment is "in effect punishment for injury to the public," it does
not seem unreasonable to assume that excess damages awarded to
private litigants may contain an element of punishment. When the
government is injured by an antitrust violation it has the purely
punitive provisions of the antitrust statutes at its disposal. If the
compensation for actual damages is also punishment, this fact tends
to blur the distinction that might otherwise be made between the
purely punitive provisions of antitrust laws and the multiple dam-
ages of the Clayton Act. Even if the distinction made by the Com-
missioner is not completely arbitrary,25 it certainly suggests that
if a court were presented with the issue of whether the treble dam-
ages of the Clayton Act contain an element of punitive damages
designed to protect the public, it might well find that they do.
Is THERE A SUFFICIENT GOVERNMENTAL DECLARATION?
If there is a penal policy in the treble damages of section 4 of
the Clayton Act, there is a sufficient governmental declaration of
that policy in the antitrust statutes to satisfy the second require-
ment for disallowing a deduction in Tellier. It is only required that
the policy be evidenced in some statute or regulation and not that
it be explicitly announced or defined.26 This requirement originated
in Lilly v. Commissioner7 where opticians were disallowed a deduc-
tion for kickbacks paid to ophthalmologists who were sending them
business. The tax court reasoned that since these payments were
considered unethical by the medical profession, to allow their deduc-
tion would frustrate a public policy against them. In reversing, the
United States Supreme Court refused to allow the tax court to roam
For a vigorous defense of the Commissioner, see Lamont, Controversial
*Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense, 42 TAXEs 829-832
(1964).28383 U.S. 687, 694 (1965).
27343 U.S. 90 (1952).
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the moral landscape in search of policy and imposed the requirement
that before a policy should be invoked against a deduction, it should
be grounded on some official declaration of public law that the acts
involved were objectionable." Since the antitrust statutes set out
both the prohibited conduct and the remedies available, they should
provide sufficient evidence of policy to satisfy the minimal require-
ment of governmental declaration in Tellier.
DOES ALLOWANCE OF THE DEDUCTION FOR TREBLE DAMAGES
PRESENT A "SEVERE" FRUSTRATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY?
The third requirement in Tellier is that the degree of frustration
that would result from a deduction be "severe." ' 9 If there is a
penal policy in Clayton Act treble damages, one can argue that to
allow a deduction would work a direct and severe frustration of
antitrust law.30 The severity test has been used by the United States
Supreme Court, however, not primarily to measure the absolute ef-
fect of allowance of a deduction on the policy of the law that has
been violated, but rather to balance this harmful effect of allowance
against the harmful effect that disallowance will have on the busi-
ness that has claimed the deduction."- This balancing process is
necessary because the legislative history of section 162 shows that
Congress has been less concerned with protecting the public from
28 1d. at 97.
383 U.S. 687, 694.See Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276
(5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945), reversing 3 T.C. 310
(1944); Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
"In Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958), the
use of the severity test was explained,
[T]he test of non-deductability always is the severity and immediacy
of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction. The
flexibility of such a standard is necessary if we are to accommodate
both the congressional intent to tax only net income and the presump-
tion against congressional intent to encourage violation of public
policy.
It would appear that the destructive effect of disallowance has also been a
factor in decisions against the Commissioner on grounds other than the
severity test. In Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952), where the
requirement of governmental declaration was first announced, the Commis-
sioner attempted to impose a total tax of $49,500 on a net profit of $25,000
for one of the taxable years in question. One writer has called this "taxation
of gross income with a vengeance." Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the
Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, 1954 So. CALiF. TAX INST. 715,
737-42.
1114 [Vol. 45
DEDUCTION OF TREBLE DAMAGES
misuse of the expense deduction than it has been interested in estab-
lishing a morally neutral concept of net income.32
The awkwardness of the severity test is dramatically illustrated
by the conflicting results of two cases decided in 1958 on the same
day by the United States Supreme Court. In Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Comm'r3" the issue was whether fines paid by a trucking
firm for violations of weight statutes could be deducted. The Court
held that they could not, saying that to allow deduction of a pay-
ment that was itself illegal would present the most severe form of
frustration of other law and that allowance of a fine would present
a slightly less severe frustration that could also not be tolerated.34
But in Commissioner v. Sullivan payments of rent and wages in the
operation of a bookmaking establishment were in issue.Y5 Although
a state statute specifically prohibited these payments, 6 the Court
held that they could be deducted: "If we enforce as federal policy
the rule espoused by the Commissioner in this case, we would come
close to making this type of business taxable on the basis of its
gross receipts, while all other business would be taxable on the basis
" The basic purpose of section 162 is to allow a determination of how
much money a business has left over after expenses. In 1913 it was urged
in debate on the first income tax bill that only lawful expenses be allowed
as deductions and the answer, in the words of Senator Williams, could not
have been clearer:
[T]he object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say,
what he has at the end of the year after deducting from his receipts
his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform men's moral character;
that is not the object of the bill at all. The tax is not levied for the
purpose of restraining people from betting on horse races or upon
"futures," but the tax is framed for the purpose of making a man pay
upon his net income, his actual profit during the year. The law does
not care where he got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although
the law may very properly care in another way.
50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913). See also SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAx LAws, 1938-1961, 995-97 (1963). Congress has since
repeatedly refused to include a provision in the Code that would generally
disallow immoral or undesirable expenses. For a detailed review see Com-
ment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems
of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE LJ. 111-112
(1962).
83356 U.S. 30 (1958).3
'Id. at 35.
356 U.S. 27 (1958).
8 Thus bringing the issue squarely within the language of the Tank
Truck Rentals, which should result in disallowance. This is distinguishable
from the situation where deduction of an otherwise legal expense incurred in
the pursuit of an illegal business is allowed. Compare Commissioner v.
Doyle, 231 F.2d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1956) with Allen v. Commissioner, 283
F.2d 785, 790 (1960).
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of net income. If that choice is to be made, Congress should do it."
The court then said that only if it were "clear that the allowance is
a device to avoid the consequences of violations of law" should the
deduction be disallowed.17
How then would Clayton Act treble damages be treated under
the severity test? On the one hand, allowance of the deduction
certainly permits the taxpayer to "avoid the consequences" of an
antitrust violation, and, if this dictum in Sullivan is followed, the
deduction should be disallowed.88 Where a Clayton Act suit is based
on a prior criminal conviction under the Sherman Act, 9 there is an
appealing argument that the relatively weak provisions of the Sher-
man Act should be buttressed through disallowance.4" On the other
hand, payment of treble damages can have a heavy impact on a firm.
If this impact is so great as to destroy or seriously impair a firm's
competitive position,41 disallowance of the deduction would conflict
"'356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
"Ibid.
"Where there has been a criminal conviction, there is no doubt that the
guilty parties knowingly entered into a conspiracy to restrain trade and it is
under these circumstances that the deterrence of non-deductability would be
most useful. In litigation over deductability of 'damages paid under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 a distinction between willful and
innocent violations was made with the result that deduction was denied
where the violation was willful but allowed where innocent. Compare Na-
tional Brass Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1051 (1951), af'd, 205
F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1953) with Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175
F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
" The number of Clayton Act suits has increased greatly in recent years
to the point where they may be considered a major means of enforcement
of antitrust law. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble
Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959). If private claimants must
pay income tax on the two-thirds excess damages received, see note 21
supra, it would perhaps be desirable to offset this factor deterring claimants
from exercising their enforcement function with a concomitant factor of
non-deductability to deter potential violators. On the other hand, it might
be more desirable in view of the basic policy of encouragement of competi-
tion to encourage claimants by excluding the two-thirds excess from gross
income and allowing deductions by defendants. See generally Loevinger,
Private Action--The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167
(1958).
' fie Attorney General has recognized the danger of excessive damages
to the competitive positions of firms, especially small firms, in his own suits
on behalf of the United States for actual damages under 4A of the Clayton
Act. In recent suits following the "Philadelphia electric cases" the Attorney
General settled for as much as 10% of total sales with major manufacturers
and as little as 2% from small firms. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITE ON
INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, STAFF STUDY OF INCOME TAX TREATMENT
OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 9-11 (Comm.
Print Nov. 1, 1965).
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with both the policy of the Internal Revenue Code to tax only net
income and the policy of the Sherman Act to encourage competi-
tion.4 2 If presented with a case where disallowance of the deduction
would have a crippling effect on a firm, a court might be motivated,
although it could not easily say so, to allow the deduction in order
to protect the competitive position of the firm. In this event the
court could allow the deduction, as in Sullivan, by stressing the
intent of Congress to tax only net income. Such a holding would
amount, however, to virtual abandonment of disallowance of deduc-
tions for fines and penalties on the grounds of public policy.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that there is no clear answer to the question
whether allowance of the deduction for treble damages frustrates
policy of the Clayton Act because it is unclear whether that policy
is penal or compensatory. There is, however, a sufficient govern-
mental declaration to justify a decision either way, and if a court
were to find a significant penal policy present in the Clayton Act,
the first and second tests in Tellier for disallowing a deduction
would be met. Furthermore, under the dictum in Sullivan, if a
penal policy were found in the Clayton Act, the third test of severity
would be met. In view of the ease, however, with which the United
States Supreme Court abandoned the position it took in Tank Truck
Rentals when it was faced, in Sullivan, with a business that would
be destroyed by disallowance, it is possible that a deduction for
Clayton Act treble damages might be allowed if necessary to pre-
serve competition. One could argue that since the issues are so un-
certain, the Commissioner was well within proper exercise of dis-
cretion to grant the deduction in a Revenue Ruling. The better
view, however, is that the Commissioner was incorrect to decide a
question of such great public interest in a way that forecloses litiga-
tion.43  HENRY C. MCFADYEN, JR.
4' The emphasis of modern antitrust law has shifted from the negative
"trustbusting" theme of the early 1900's to a more positive theme of main-
taining competition in all possible ways. Penalties which are so great as to
damage ability to compete would be self-defeating. See generally NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-30 (1962).
'" For the views of Senator Hart, Chairman of the Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, and Representative Celler, Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary and its Antitrust Subcommittee, see 42 TAXES
830 (1964). See generally United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 187
(1939).
